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The Timor Gap: Who Decides Who is in
Control?
BrandiJ. Pummell
I.

FACTS

&

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

East Timor lies just opposite Australia and includes the island of
Atauro, the islet of Jaco, and Oe-Cusse in the Western part of Timor.'
Portugal colonized East Timor in the 16th Century and occupied the
area until 1975.2 The Dutch controlled the Western part of the island
which later became Indonesia. 3 As part of the decolonization process,
the United Nations named Portugal Administering Power over the nonself governing territory of East Timor. 4 As such, Portugal was expected
to protect the interests of East Timor and make regular statistical and
informational reports on the country to the Secretary General of the
United Nations;5 Portugal never fulfilled its duties toward East Timor
and the United Nations. 6 It continued to treat East Timor as an overseas province despite several Security Council resolutions condemning
7
it for failing to implement the United Nations' decolonization policy.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law, 1999. I want to recognize the support of my family and friends, especially Mom and Jodi who took the time to proof-read
this article. I also want to thank Martha Ertman for helping me with my writing.
1. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 95 (June 30).
2. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
3. Id.
4. In 1960, the U.N. appointed Portugal the Administering Power of the non-selfgoverning territory of East Timor. G.A. Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 16, at
30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Some controversy remains about whether Portugal continues to be the Administering Power of East Timor following its withdrawal from East
Timor on April 24, 1974. While U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 3485 and Security
Counsel Resolution 384 referred to Portugal as the Administrating Power in East Timor,
no later resolutions have reconfirmed its status. G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
2439th plen. mtg. at 1294, U.N. Doc. A/10426 (1975); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th
Sess., 1869th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/119915 (1975).
5. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114.
6. Id.
7. Id. Oda, J. wrote:
In 1963, the Security Counsel.. depreciated the attitudes of the Portuguese Government and its repeated violations of the principle of the
Charter, urgently calling upon Portugal to implement the decolonization policy (resolutions 180 (1963) and 183 (1963)) and in 1965 once
again passed a resolution deploring Portugal's failure to comply with
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Finally, during the Carnation Rebellion of April 1974, Portuguese
authorities abruptly abandoned East Timor after 400 years of colonization, never to return.8 Indonesia eventually restored order to the country by sending a 10,000 man army into East Timor in December of
1975, claiming one of East Timor's leading political parties had requested annexation into Indonesia. 9 Indonesia has remained in control
of East Timor ever since. 10
Alleging that the people of East Timor wanted to join it, Indonesia
annexed East Timor on July 17, 1976.11 The U.N. General Assembly
and Security Council responded with resolutions calling on "all states to
respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable
right of its people to self-determination" and requesting that Indonesia
remove its forces from the area without delay. 12 The United Nations
also applied for Portuguese assistance in preserving East Timor's right
to self-determination in its capacity as Administering Power of East
Timor. Similar resolutions emerged periodically from the Security
Council until 1976, and from the General Assembly until 1982.13 Despite this ongoing discussion of the plight of East Timor, the United Nations took no action.14
Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized Indonesia's de
facto incorporation of East Timor with a statement that Indonesia controlled "all major administrative cent[ers] of the territory." 15 Therefore,
it would be "unrealistic to continue to refuse to recognize de facto that
East Timor is part of Indonesia." 16 Nevertheless, Australia continued to
protest the means through which Indonesia acquired control over East
17
Timor.
the previous General Assembly and Security Counsel resolutions
(resolution 218 (1965)).
In 1972, the Security Counsel repeated its condemnation of the persistent refusal of Portugal to implement the earlier resolutions (resolutions 312 (1972) and 3222 (1972)).
8. Id. Interestingly, the Portuguese Constitution never acknowledged the right to
self-determination of the people of East Timor's until after the Carnation Rebellion. Id.
9. Id. See William Branigan, E. Timorese Chafe Under a Foreign Yoke; Indonesia
Resented for 20-Year Rule, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1994, at A25.
10. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114.
11. Id.
12. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 119915 (1975).
13. Over several years, United Nations' organs passed ten resolutions on this issue.
The most important include: G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 2439th plen. mtg. at
1294, U.N. Doc. A/10426 (1975); G.A. Res. 34/40, U.N. GAOR, 34th, Sess., Supp. No. 46, at
206, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
227, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. 1869th
mtg. at 1, S/119915 (1975); and S.C. Res. 398, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/389 (1976).
14. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 97.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Australia and Indonesia entered into a continental shelf delineation agreement in 1970-7118 which omitted any reference to the Timor
Gap. 19 It was not until 1979 that Australia and Indonesia addressed the
Timor Gap. The two countries made little progress until the Treaty on
the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of
East Timor and Northern Australia,20 in which they decided to develop
joint exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf. 21 This treaty

created a zone of cooperation between East Timor and Northern Australia. 22 When Australia took internal steps to implement the treaty,
Portugal, as Administrating Power, brought an application against
Australia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenging the
23
treaties validity.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CASE CONCERNING

EAST TIMOR

The ICJ is open to all states. 24 All members of the United Nations
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and non-members may elect to become parties to the Statute on
conditions to be determined by the General Assembly upon recommendations of the Security Council. 25 In addition, states belonging to neither the U.N. nor the Statute of the ICJ may become parties before the
Court by accepting the jurisdiction 26 of the court in accordance with the
U.N. Charter, Statute and Rules of the Court, and agreeing to assume
18. Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of Timor and
Arafura Seas 1972, Oct. 9, 1972, Austl.-Indon., 974 U.N.T.S. 319.
19. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 98.
20. Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia,
Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon., 29 I.L.M. 475 (1990) [hereinafter Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation].
21. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 98. The Zone of Cooperation encompasses a 61,000
square kilometer area with Indonesia and Australia jointly exploiting the Central Zone 'A'
thought to be the most profitable. Exploration done in 1994-95 indicated that oil and gas
wells in the area produce as many as seven thousand barrels of oil a day and the field
may contain two-hundred million barrels of crude oil. Nikki Tait, Oil Muddies Claims to
Timor Sea: Nikki Tait on Implications of a Case Starting at the Hague, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at 5.
22. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 97.
23. Id. at 90.
24. Public organizations and legal or natural persons cannot be parties before the
ICJ, but the Court can keep them informed about items of interest. GEORGE ELIAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 52 (1971).
25. Id.
26. Jurisdiction has many meanings but it most often refers to the "powers exercised
by a state over persons, property, or events."
MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (6th ed., 1993). However, here we are concerned with the ability of the ICJ to hear the case and issue a judgment that binds Portugal and Australia.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:4

and fulfill the same duties and conditions created by a decision of the
ICJ as apply to U.N. members. 27 Even members of the U.N. may submit disputes to other tribunals pursuant to past or future agreements,
but if they resort to the ICJ for settlement of their disputes, they must
comply with its decisions. 28 A party wishing to enforce the Court's decisions may seek a recommendation of enforcement from the Security
29
Council.
Because members of the U.N. refused to accept the principle of
compulsory jurisdiction at the San Francisco Conference that created
the United Nations, "a preliminary agreement, called a compromis, establishes the terms under which [a] dispute will be arbitrated by the
Court. 30 This rejection of compulsory jurisdiction results naturally from
the states' desire to preserve their independence. 31 However, parties
sometimes make preliminary agreements to submit certain types of
disputes to the ICJ by treaty provision. 32 The Court has interpreted
such provisions narrowly to preserve its prestige and to ensure that its
33
decisions are complied with.
In 1995, the International Court of Justice considered whether it
had jurisdiction to decide Portugal's case against Australia. Under international law states are independent and equal, so that no state may
exercise jurisdiction over another without its consent. 34 Similarly, ICJ
jurisdiction in contentious proceedings requires consent by all parties
directly affected by an action. 35 Consent can take one of many forms. 36
Normally, parties refer a case to the Court jointly, but nothing precludes each from doing so separately. Once proceedings have started, a
defendant may accept jurisdiction 37 explicitly in the form of an express
statement 38 or implicitly by defending the case on the merits without
challenging the jurisdiction of the Court. 39 In addition, states may exercise the option clause to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in
advance of a dispute. 40 A recommendation by the Security Council or
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
(1928).

Id. at 52.
Id. at 46.
Id.
ELIAN, supra note 24, at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 111.
Id. at 246.
Id.

Id.
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 15-17 (Apr. 9).
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minorities Schools), 1947-48 P.C.I.J. 20-25

40. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 247.

2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
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the ICJ itself will not bind states to the Court's jurisdiction. 4' Furthermore, states accept compulsory jurisdiction only with respect to states
who have accepted the same obligation. 42 This prevents them from
benefiting from a ruling by the ICJ without also being bound by it. Although Australia and Portugal previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court concluded it could not exercise jurisdiction over the case because any decision made by the Court would
inextricably affect the rights of Indonesia, a non-consenting third-party
43
to the dispute.
On Feb. 22, 1991, the Portuguese Ambassador to the Netherlands
filed an application to institute proceedings against Australia concerning certain activities with respect to East Timor. 44 Portugal alleged
that Australia had "failed to observe . . . [its] obligation to respect the
duties and powers of [Portugal as] the administrating Power" of East
Timor and the right of its people to self-determination. 4 5 Accordingly,
Portugal asked that the Court order appropriate reparations to Portu46
gal and East Timor.
Portugal and Australia had already acceded to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, 47 in accordance with the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. 48 However, Indonesia had not. 49 The U.N. immediately comagreement, in relation to any other state the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes...
3. The declarations referred to may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a
certain time.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No, 933,
3 Bevans 1179, art. 36, paras. 2, 3. By 1993, 47 states (29%) had issued such a statement. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 247.
41. On the Albanian Acceptance of the Court's Jurisdiction, 1947-48 P.C.I.J. 15, 3132.
42. Id.
43. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 105.
44. Id. at 92.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 95.
47. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90. Prior to addressing the merits of a case, the International Court of Justice considers preliminary issues such as: 1) jurisdiction, 2) nationality,
and 3) the exhaustion of local remedies. These issues are usually dealt with separately,
as in this case, before proceeding to the rest of the controversy. Akehurst has characterized jurisdiction as the real difficulty in achieving binding ICJ judgments. Reasons for
this distrust include: 1) the unpredictability of decisions; 2) the impression that decisions
are arbitrary due to the large number of dissents; 3) decisions are precedential; 4) perception that the Court changes the law; or 5) that it is too conservative; 6) blur between legitimate customary law and claims for change in existing law; and 7) concern for international reputation and relations. AKEHURST, supranote 26, at 248-52.
48. Id. Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides that:
2. The states party to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special

660
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municated the substance of Portugal's application to Australia and all
other interested states entitled to appear before the Court. 50 There
were concerns about the possible impact of any decision on the rights of
51
Indonesia who had not accepted ICJ jurisdiction.
In its counter-memorial filed on June 1, 1992, Australia questioned
the Court's jurisdiction as well as the admissibility of the Application
itself. 52 Because both parties felt these issues were inextricably linked
to the merits of the case, Australia deferred its objection until consideration of the merits of the case pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules of
the Court.5 3 Portugal filed a reply prior to Dec. 1, 1992. The ICJ accepted Australia's rejoinder on July 5, 1993, following an extension of
the deadline until July 1, 199354 and discretionary review of the timeli55
ness of the filing in accordance with its rules.
Next, each party to the proceedings took advantage of the ICJ statute provision allowing parties not already represented by the regular
members of the court to appoint an ad hoc judge to sit on the court for
the duration of the dispute.5 6 Portugal selected Mr. Antonio de Arruda

agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
the interpretation of a treaty;
any question of international law;
the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
3 ....

4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary General of
the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to
the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5 ....

6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933,
3 Bevans 1179, art. 36, para. 2.
49. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 93.
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 40, paras. 2-3.
51. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102.
52. Id. at 91.
53. Id. at 92.
54. Id. at 93.
55. ICJ Rules, art. 44, para. 3.
56. "If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality to the parties,
each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph two of this
article." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 31, para. 3. This practice is a survival of the traditional custom of appointing arbitrators and may be necessary to reassure litigants. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 245.
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Ferrer-Correria and Australia, Sir Ninian Martin Stephen. 57 Unfortunately, Mr. Ferrera-Correria became unable to sit on the Court and notified the ICJ of that fact by a letter dated June 30, 1994.58 Portugal
then appointed Mr. Krysztof Jan Skubiszewski to replace him on July
59
14, 1994.
During oral arguments, Portugal first asked the ICJ to recognize
the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination, territorial
integrity and unity, and to sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, and the duties, powers, and rights of Portugal as the Administering Power of East Timor. 60 Then, Portugal argued that by negotiating the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation to the exclusion of Portugal,
Australia infringed on East Timor's right to self-determination, territorial integrity and unity, and its permanent sovereignty over its natural
wealth and resources. It impeded Portugal in its duties to the people of
East Timor and to the international community and breached an international obligation to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations
61
respecting its policy towards East Timor.
Portugal also wanted the ICJ to find that Australia ignored its duty
to "harmonize" conflicting rights or claims over maritime areas by excluding Portugal from negotiations with respect to the exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf within the Timor Gap,. 62 Finally,
Portugal requested that the Court order Australia to pay reparations to
the people of East Timor and to Portugal and to order Australia to refrain from implementing the treaty until East Timor exercised its right
to self-determination. 63 Specifically, Portugal wanted Australia to refrain from negotiating, signing, or ratifying any agreement with a State
other than the Administering Power concerning the delimitation, exploration or exploitation of the continental shelf, or the exercise of jurisdiction over that shelf in the areas of the Timor Gap. 64 Essentially, Portugal sought exclusive rights to negotiate with Australia on behalf of East
Timor.
Australia responded with two arguments. First, it claimed the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims or, alternatively, if the ICJ
had jurisdiction the claims submitted for consideration were inadmissi-

57. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 93.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 94. After consulting with both parties, the Court decided that the pleadings
and attached documents should be made available to the public, in accordance with ICJ
Rules, art. 53, paragraph 2, from the beginning of oral proceeding on Jan. 30, 1995. Public
hearings commenced on Jan. 30, and lasted until Feb. 16.
61. Id.
62. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 94.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ble. 65 Then, it asserted its actions had in no way disregarded Portugal's
rights. 66 No real dispute existed between Australia and Portugal to give
Portugal standing to institute proceedings.6 7 Finally, Australia pointed
out that any ruling on Portugal's Application would require the Court to
68
rule on the rights and obligations of an absent third party, Indonesia.
The Court concluded Indonesia's interest in the Treaty on the Zone
of Cooperationprevented it from addressing the merits of the case.
By refusing to exercise jurisdiction over this dispute the International Court of Justice constructively abandoned the people of East
Timor by failing to consult them and deferring any judgment as to who
controls the Timor Gap. The Court was justifiably concerned with
avoiding any threat to Indonesia's sovereignty, yet, this concern unduly
overshadowed East Timor's right to self-determination; it ignored the
erga omnes 69 principle of self-determination. The Majority expressed
great concern for the effect of any decision on Indonesia's rights, yet,
why should the Court grant Indonesia greater control of the destiny of
East Timor than the people of East Timor themselves? Judge Vereshchetin properly felt that the majority ignored the rights of the most important third party to the dispute, the people of East Timor.
III. CONTINENTAL SHELF DELINEATION

Since Portugal's dispute with Australia involves the exploitation of
the continental shelP 0 in the Timor Gap between East Timor and Australia, a simple overview of the law of the sea is advisable. International law divides the sea into three different zones: a) internal waters,
b) territorial seas/ waters, and the c) high seas. 71 Each zone has its
own rules. Internal waters consist of ports, harbors, rivers, lakes, and
canals. 72 Within its internal waters, a coastal state may apply and en-

65. Id.
66. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
67. Id. at 99.
68. Id.
69. Erga omnes rights are opposable to, and valid against, the whole world and all legal persons irrespective of consent. Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 306 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Ammoun, J.). All states
have an affirmative obligation under customary law to protect the internal selfdetermination of states. Reginald Eztah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry,
33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 508 (1997).
70. In most parts of the world, the seabed slopes gently away from the coast for quite
a long distance before it plunges deeply into the great ocean depths. This gently sloping
seabed, covered by shallow water, is called the continental shelf by geologists, and in prehistoric time was dry land. For the purpose of Truman's proclamation, the continental
shelf was defined as being those offshore areas of the seabed which were not more than
100 fathoms deep. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 188.
71. Id. at 168.
72. Id. at 169.
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force its own laws, and exclude foreign warships. 73 Territorial waters
extend from four to twelve miles beyond a state's internal waters. 74 The
coastal states exercise sovereignty over territorial waters subject only to
the 'right of innocent passage' by foreign vessels. 75 However, territorial
waters never extend more than twelve miles beyond a recognized baseline roughly corresponding to the low-tide mark. 76 The term 'high seas'
covers all waters not included in either the internal or territorial waters
of any state. 77 On the high seas, all ships possess freedom of navigation, fishing, and lying cables and pipeline as well as free access to the
airspace overhead. 78 Vessels on the high seas generally lay beyond the
79
jurisdiction of any but the flag-state.
A number of relatively recent innovations have blurred the distinctions between these three traditional classifications of the sea. Contiguous Zones emerged during the period between the two World Wars
"as a means of rationalizing" conflicting state practices with regard to
the high seas adjacent to territorial waters.80 Despite initial criticism,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the TerritorialSea and the Contiguous
Zone provides that "a coastal state may act to: [ ] prevent [and punish]
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations

73. Id. at 170. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule:
The coastal state does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction. A vessel's
flag state my try individuals for crimes committed while on board the
ship;
A coastal state should not interfere with a captain's disciplinary action
over his crew;
The flag-state generally deals with those matters not effecting the
good order of the coastal state or its inhabitants; and
A coastal state should not profit from the distress of foreign vessels by
charging harbor duties and taxes in excess of the cost of services provided.
Id.
74. Id. at 171.
75. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 171. The following rights attach to territorial seas:
1) the exclusive right to fish and exploit seabed resources; 2) sovereignty over the airspace
over territorial waters; 3) the right of cabotage, or the internal transportation of goods
and people; 4) the right to exclude belligerents; 5) the right to regulate navigation, health,
customs, duties and immigration within its territorial waters; 6) the power to arrest occupants of merchant vessels; and concurrent jurisdiction, shared with the flag-ship, over
crimes committed on merchant ships. Id. at 172.
76. Id. at 177-78.
77. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signatureApril 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) art. 1.
78. Id. art. 2. Some of these freedoms can be restricted by Exclusive Fishing Zones or
Exclusive Economic Zones. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 181.
79. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 182. Exceptions apply to: 1) Exclusive Fishing
Zones, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Contiguous Zones; 2) Stateless ships; 3) Hot pursuit; 4) Right of approach; 5) Treaties; 6) Piracy; 7) Belligerent rights; 8) Self-defense; and
9) United Nations' authorization. Id. at 183-187.
80. Id. at 179.
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within its territory or territorial sea."81 Despite some variation, contiguous zones never extend beyond twelve miles from the territorial sea
82
for a maximum of twenty-four miles from the baseline.
Prior to 1945, states shared access to the seabed and subsoil of the
high seas.8 3 This changed when President Truman proclaimed that the
United States had the exclusive right to resources contained in the continental shelf off the coasts of the United States.8 4 A number of states
followed Truman's example and twenty had made their own continental
shelf claims by 1958.85 The Convention on the Continental Shelf recognizes "sovereign rights" over the natural resources8 6 of the continental
shelf.87 The continental shelf encompasses the seabed and subsoil of

areas adjacent to the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters, or "where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources."88 The coastal state has exclusive jurisdiction over
the continental shelf even if it chooses not to explore or exploit its resources. No one else may do so without the express consent of the
coastal state. 89 Furthermore, these rights do not depend on occupation
or an express proclamation of the right. 90 Although a number of states
never signed the Continental Shelf Treaty, the ICJ recognized that it
had become customary international law 9 by 1969 when it decided the
North Seas ContinentalShelf Cases.92
81. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
82. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 179.
83. Id. at 188.
84. Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and the Seabed of the Continental Shelf, White House Press Release of Sept. 29, 1945, 13
DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 485-86 (July-Dec. 1945).
85. BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1025 (1995). At least
one author has labeled the Continental Shelf Doctrine a classic case of the formation of a
new rule of customary law, with the U.S. establishing a precedent and others acquiescing
in continental shelf claims. AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 189.
86. Natural resources are the "mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed
and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species." Convention
on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 2.
87. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supranote 85, at 1027.
88. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311, art. 1.
89. Id. art. 2.
90. Id.
91. Until recently, international law consisted of customary rules that had evolved
after a long historical process culminating in their recognition by the international community. Customary rules crystallize from usages or practices which have evolved in
roughly 3 circumstances: 1) diplomatic relations among states; 2) the practice of international organs; and 3) state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative practices that suggest wide acceptance of a general principal of law. J. Starke,
Introduction to InternationalLaw, 34-28, reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 85,
at 141-43.
92. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
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The writers of the Continental Shelf Treaty anticipated disputes
over maritime boundaries among neighboring states. Consequently, the
treaty provides that :
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such states shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
93
sea of each state is measured.
94
Nonetheless, the median line is not binding customary law.
Rather, states must negotiate in good faith to reach some type of equitable agreement on continental shelf delineation. 95 However, the desire
of Portugal and Australia to exercise control over the continental shelf
of the Timor Gap conflicted with the people of East Timor's right to selfdetermination.

IV. SELF-DETERMINATION: 96 THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ONE'S OWN
DESTINY

Despite some uncertainty about its origins, 97 legal scholars generally agree that President Wilson "elevate[d]the principle of selfdetermination to an international level"98 through his Fourteen Points,
recognizing "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . .' 99 The League of Nations implicitly ac-

(Feb. 20).
93. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S.
311, art. 6(1).
94. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 46-54.
95. Id.
96. For a general discussion of the evolution of the right to self-determination see Ved
Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Succeed, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L., 257, 265-71 (1981).
97. Some scholars claim the concept of self-determination existed at the time of the
Greek city states. See James Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination:A Jeffersonian
Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 212 (1991). Cf., Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination,
Minority Rights and ConstitutionalAccommodation: The Example of the Czech and Sloyak Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 172, 173 (1991) (attributing principle of selfdetermination to the French and American revolutions).
98. Halim Morris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 203, (1997).
99. President Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), reprintedin 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916).
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cepted the principle of self-determination, 0 0 thereby leading to its subsequent incorporation into the United Nations Charter. 10' By the
1960's and '70's, ICJ advisory opinions, 0 2 treaties 0 3 and the charters of
regional organizations 10 4 expressed support for self-determination. Today, the international community considers the right to selfdetermination jus cogens, 105 that imposes binding obligations on all nation states. 06 All peoples possess an affirmative right to selfdetermination which is "seen as a prerequisite to any genuine enjoy07
ment of any of the human rights."'
Nonetheless, confusion remains about the scope and character of
self-determination. Some scholars feel the right extends only to colonies or areas subject to foreign control. 08 This so called 'external selfdetermination' gives people subject to colonization or foreign occupation
the right to govern their own affairs free from outside interference.' 09
Others disagree, saying that the right to self-determination belongs to
all peoples, including minorities and indigenous people living within

100. Ved Nanda, Self-Determination: The Case of Palestine, 82 AM. SOCY INT'L L.
PROC. 334, 335 (1988).
101. The U.N. Charter calls on member states "to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. It also creates a trusteeship system designed to
"promote the progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territories toward
self-government or independence, taking into account the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned," and requiring members to become the administering powers and protect the interests of those countries whose people had not yet attained self-government.
U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
102. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
103. See, e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, at 123, Doc. A/802 (1970).
104. Charter of the Organization for African Unity, May 25, 1963, African States 479
U.N.T.S. 39.
105. Self-Determination has peremptory normative status (jus cogens) in international
law and can be set aside only by a subsequent peremptory norm of contrary effect. Therefore, the right to self-determination of "all peoples" and nations overrides customary international law. Eztah, supra note 69, at 495.
106. Morris, supra note 98, at 204.
107. Id.
108. See Sam Blay, Self-Determination:A Reassessment in the Post Communist Era, 22
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275 (1994); Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post Cold
War Era:A New InternationalFocus?, 16 MICH.J. INT'L L. 733 (1995).
109. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 49 (1990).
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existing countries. 11 0 This broader definition known as 'internal selfdetermination', gives minorities and indigenous people control over
their own destinies."'
While some people believe that the term includes the right to succeed, others advocate no more than the right to
select a representative government using a legitimate political process. 112 Although unclear in this opinion, the Majority appears to adopt
the external self-determination position, possible out of fear of alienating its members with substantial minority populations. Since East
Timor's relationship with Indonesia falls within the narrower category,
a deeper look at external self-determination is warranted.
The U.N. Charter forbids nation states from interfering with the
territorial integrity of other nation states."13 Similarly, external selfdetermination is the right of individuals to be independent and free
from outside interference. 11 4 The U.N. Declarationon the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and People, found the "subjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" contrary to
the U.N. Charter and "an impediment to the promotion of world peace
and cooperation."' 1 5 Although external self-determination applies in
both the colonization and foreign domination contexts, colonial claims
rarely arise today. 16 Instead, claims increasingly emerge from the foreign domination of one state over the other, 117 as with the Indonesian
occupation of East Timor.
Part of the increase in external self-determination claims may result from an expansion in the traditional definition of foreign domination to include militaristic domination, such as when the troops of one
country are stationed in another; economic domination, when one or
more countries economically dominate another; and cultural domination, where one culture dominates the other. 1 8 In Self-Determination:
Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, Halim Morris specifically mentions
the Lebanese objection to the presence of Syrian and Israeli troops in
their country, and American troops in Panama and Okinawa as forms of
militaristic foreign domination."19 Various third world nations view

110. Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 209, 248 (1992).
111. Morris, supra note 98, at 205.
112. Compare Nanda, supra note 96, at 275 and Catharine J. Jorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L.
199, 353 (1993).
113. U.N. Charter art. 2.
114. Henry J. Richardson III, Rights of Self-Determination of People in Established
States: Southern Africa and the Middle East, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 541, 545 (1991).
115. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
116. Morris, supranote 98, at 207.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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economic domination by developed nations as a lack of economic selfdetermination.1 20 Moreover, various ethnic groups throughout the
world have begun to assert a right to cultural self-determination in re21
sponse to foreign domination centering on language and religion.
Morris notes that these claims for external self-determination have
been largely ignored by the international community. 122 Indonesia's
1975 invasion of East Timor was no exception. Despite hundreds of
thousands of deaths attributed to the invasion, the outside world paid
little attention to the area until November of 1991 when Indonesian
forces killed an estimated two-hundred and seventy protestors in a
cemetery in Dili.123
V. THE ICJ DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Is the Dispute Really between Portugal and Australia?
The ICJ began its evaluation of Portugal's application by addressing Australia's contention that Indonesia was the true focus of the dispute over East Timor. Australia characterized the situation as a ploy
by Portugal to "artificially limit[ ] ... [the case]to the question of the
lawfulness of [it's] conduct" because Portugal and Australia had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and Indonesia had
not.124 Furthermore, Australia insisted it had always recognized East
Timor's status as a non-self-governing territory, the corresponding right
of its people to self-determination, and Portugal's status as Administrating Power under the authority of the United Nations. 125 The real
dispute lay between Portugal and Indonesia over who had authority to
negotiate international agreements on behalf of East Timor. 126
At this point, the Court defined dispute as "a disagreement on a
point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties." 27 The existence of a dispute requires: 1) that the "claim of one

120. Id.
121. Morris, supra note 98, at 207.
122. Id.
123. See John Pilger, We Resist to Win. It is 20 Years Since Indonesia Invaded East
Timor, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 1995, at T022.; John Pilger, The Rising of Indonesia, June,
16, 1995 NEW STATESMAN & SoC'Y 14; Timor Trembles, ASIAN WALL ST. J., MAY 20, 1994,

at 8.
124. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 95.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 99. See Mavromatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 11; Concerning Northern Cameroons, Judgment, 1963 I.C.J. 27 (Dec.
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party [be] positively opposed by the other,"' 28 2) as a matter of objective
determination. 1 29 Here, the Court found the determinative factor not to
be whether the "real dispute" implicated Indonesia rather than Australia, but whether Portugal had correctly alleged complaints of law and
fact against Australia which were denied. 130 Since Australia and Portugal clearly disagreed about whether Australia breached any obligation to Portugal in negotiating, concluding, and implementing Treaty on
the Zone of Cooperation with Indonesia, the Court concluded that a le131
gal dispute existed and dismissed Australia's objection.
Next, the Court considered whether a ruling on Portugal's application necessarily involved a determination of Indonesia's rights and obligations towards East Timor. Australia's argument relied on the ICJ's
holding in Monetary Gold that it could not rule on a case where the
rights of unrepresented third party formed the subject matter of the decision. 132 Under this rational, any decision made with regard to Portugal's Application would necessarily imply a ruling on the lawfulness of
Indonesia's entry and occupation of East Timor since 1974, the validity
of the continental shelf treaty governing the Timor Gap, and consequently, Indonesia's obligations under that treaty, so that the consensual nature of ICJ jurisdiction prevented the Court from exercising ju33
risdiction over the case.'
In contrast, Portugal insisted that the Court could limit its decision
to the objective conduct of Australia in negotiating, concluding, and implementing its treaty with Indonesia. Portugal characterized the dispute as a distinct breach of Australia's obligation to deal with East
Timor as a non-self-governing territory, including Portugal in its capacity as Administering Power. With the objective conduct of Australia
as the only violation of international law, Portugal saw no reason to involve Indonesia in the controversy.
With these arguments in mind, the Majority reminded both parties

2); and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. at 27, para. 35.
128. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 328 (Mar. 9).
129. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, First
Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 74 (Mar. 30).
130. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 100.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Every member of the United Nations automatically becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and has access to the court. However, a state
does not grant the Court jurisdiction over any class of cases or any one dispute by becoming a party to the statute. To submit to the Court's jurisdiction, states must make declarations under Article 30 of the ICJ Statute. David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of
the Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 435, 438 (Fall 1995 -Winter 1996).
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that the fundamental principles of the ICJ Statute require the consent
of all parties affected by a dispute for the exercise of jurisdiction.' 34 The
Court pointed out that Portugal's application assumed that its position
as Administering Power gave it exclusive power to negotiate and conclude treaties on behalf of East Timor. 135 However, Australia expressed
a belief that Portugal lost that right with its withdrawal from East
Timor. 136 Australia concluded the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation
understanding that the right to negotiate on behalf of East Timor had
passed to Indonesia, in accordance with international law, when the latter occupied and later annexed East Timor in 1974.137 The Court decided it could not rule on Australia's behavior without a preliminary determination on Indonesia's authority to negotiate and adopt the treaty
in 1989.138 Since this determination depended on the circumstances
under which Indonesia had entered and occupied East Timor, the ICJ
felt it could not consider the matter without Indonesia's consent. 139
Next, Portugal argued that Australia violated rights erga omnes. 140
Consequently, Portugal could enforce those rights on behalf of East
Timor regardless of whether another state also acted unlawfully. 14' The
Court acknowledged self-determination as a right erga omnes under the
U. N. Charter and contemporary law, but distinguished it from the rule
for consent to jurisdiction. 142 Therefore, the ICJ refused to evaluate any
case which passes judgment on an absent third party, even where
rights erga omnes might be at stake. 43
Finally, Portugal attempted to convince the Court that former General Assembly and Security Council resolutions provided conclusive
proof of Portugal's status as its Administering Power of the non-selfgoverning territory of East Timor. 144 Therefore, the Court need only in-

134. Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (Italy v. U.K. & N. Ire. & U.S.), 1954
I.C.J. 32 (June 15). See also Concerning Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/
Malta), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 25, para. 40; Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 431, para. 88 (Nov. 26); Frontier
Dispute (Burkina Faso! Republic of Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 579, para. 49 (Dec. 22);
Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/ Honduras),
Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1990 I.C.J. 114-116, paras. 54-56, 112, para. 73
(Sept. 13); and Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 259-262, paras. 50-55 (June 26).
135. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 101.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 101-02.
138. Id. at 102.
139. Id.
140. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 103.
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terpret these resolutions and could avoid ruling upon questions related
to Indonesia's presence in East Timor.1 45 The judges found several
flaws in this argument. First, it ignored the passage of time.1 46 Second,
the U.N. Resolutions relied on by Portugal did not bind the international community. 147 The Court was unprepared to read the resolutions
as preventing other states from recognizing the authority of Indonesia
over East Timor exclusively in favor of Portugal.1 48 As for Portugal and
Australia, East Timor remained a non-self-governing territory.1 49 Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council took no action against Indonesia in response to Portugal's complaint at the conclusion of treaty negotiations in December of 1989.150 Consequently,
the Court felt that it could not rely on the past U. N. resolutions as a
basis for a decision.51 This left the original jurisdictional question unresolved.
Despite its ruling in this case, the ICJ carefully noted that some
circumstances might not prevent the adjudication of matters affecting
non-parties. 152 The distinguishing factor appears to be whether a determination is a prerequisite to the controversy at issue. Here, the
Majority felt the legality of Indonesia's actions would be the very subject matter of the dispute, precluding the ICJ from exercising jurisdiction.153
154

B. Judge Oda's Concurrence

Judge Oda agreed that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to rule on Portugal's application, but he perceived the true controversy as one between
Portugal and Indonesia over who had the authority to negotiate the
continental shelf treaties on behalf of East Timor. 15 5 Until some determination of Portugal's authority to act on behalf of East Timor, the
state lacked standing to sue Australia for breach of duties in relation to
56
the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation.

145. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 104.
150. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 104.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Even though the ICJ decided 14-2 not to exercise jurisdiction over the Case Concerning East Timor, the four concurring judges agreed with the outcome of the case but
not the reasoning behind the Majority's decision. This makes the case less clearly decided
than it initially appears. The four concurring opinions illustrate the diversity of views
concerning the Timor Gap and Portugal's status as Administrative Power.
155. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 107 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
156. Id.
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Furthermore, Oda found no evidence that Australia's actions
1 57
threatened the East Timorian right to self-determination in any way.
Australia merely sought to enter negotiations with a third party representative of East Timor regarding an existing claim to the seabed in the
Timor Gap.158 As explained earlier continental shelf is a legal concept
and they often overlap. Under customary international law, Australia
was "entitled ipso jure to its own continental shelf in the southern part
of the Timorian Sea - - but at the same time a State which has territorial sovereignty over East Timor and which lies opposite to Australia ...has title to the continental shelf off its coast in the northern part
of the 'Timor Gap'."15 9 Australia negotiated with the country across the
water, Indonesia, as provided for by the Law of the Sea 160 and Conti1
nental Shelf Conventions.16
In fact, Oda pointed to Portugal's failure to negotiate delineation of
the Timor Gap during the initial continental shelf talks between Australia and Indonesia in 1970-71 as an indication that Portugal may
have felt it lacked authority to negotiate on behalf of East Timor at that
time.162 Oda did not dispute Portugal's control over East Timor from
the 16th Century until the early 1970's.163 Yet, he argued that Portugal
failed in its duties as Administering Power of East Timor. 164 Following
Portugal's abandonment of East Timor in 1974, few members of the international community regarded Portugal as the representative of East
Timor.1 65 Consequently, anything lost by the people of East Timor in
the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation belonged to Australia or the state
across the water. 166 If Portugal objected to the treaty, it should have
challenged Indonesia who clearly claimed coastal state status on behalf
of East Timor.1 67 Consequently, Portugal lacked standing to sue Australia until after the claims against Indonesia with regard to East
1 68
Timor had been settled in its favor.
C. Judge Shahabuddeen's Concurrence
In his separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen discussed the con157. Id. at 108-12.
158. Id. at 110.

159. Id.
160. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982).
161. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 110 (Oda, J., separate opinion). Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
162. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 111-112 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
163. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 117-18.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 118.
167. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 112 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
168. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
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sent principle of jurisdiction. 169 Although article 50 of the ICJ statute
makes it clear that ICJ decisions bind only the parties to a dispute, this
does not necessarily permit the Court to disregard the effect of its decisions on unconsenting third parties. 170 The International Court of Justice lacks 'indispensable party' rules to safeguard absent third parties
so Monetary Gold precludes the Court from exercising jurisdiction without the consent of the third party. 171 Since international cases rarely
remain completely bilateral, Monetary Gold sets the line between tolerable and intolerable exercise of jurisdiction, whether the legal interests
72
of a third party "constitute the very subject matter of the dispute."
Monetary Gold has been distinguished but not overruled. 173 For example, Corfu Channel held that the conduct of a third party did not necessarily preclude the exercise of ICJ jurisdiction because the court could
rule on Albania's conduct without making a legal determination about
Yugoslavia's conduct. 74 Although Judge Shahabuddeen insisted that
the ICJ had a responsibility to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent, he concluded the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over
75
Portugal's application.
The inherent conflict between Indonesia's negotiation of the continental shelf treaty on behalf of East Timor and Portugal's claim of exclusive authority to do so prevented the ICJ from separating the two issues. 76 This concluded the matter except for Portugal's claim that U.
N. resolutions had already conclusively determined the issue. Shahabuddeen disagreed saying that Portugal really wanted the Court to
accept its rendition of those resolutions. 177 In order to interpret the U.
N. resolutions, the Court would have to investigate other matters, such
as whether Indonesia engaged in international responsibility that disqualified it from acquiring treaty-making power for East Timor under
178
general international law.
Even without addressing these issues, a ruling by the ICJ necessarily impacts Indonesia's rights and obligations under the Treaty on

169. Id. Remember, international lawyers and jurists chose not to adopt universal
compulsory jurisdiction because it conflicted with basic ideas of states sovereignty. Instead, the Court exercises jurisdiction over member states only after they have accepted it
under the Optional Clause. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 36(2). The ICJ Statute gives the
Court the power to decide its own jurisdiction so that states may not contest jurisdiction
in order to avoid a ruling by the ICJ. Reilly & Ordonez, supra note 133, at 441-45.
170. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 121 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
174. Corfu Channel, Merits, 11 AMER. J. INT'L L. 683 (1917).
175. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 122 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
176. Id. at 123.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 124.
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the Zone of Cooperation without its consent. 179 If Portugal successfully
enjoined Australia from implementing the treaty, Indonesia would lose
the concrete benefits of the treaty it negotiated for.' 80 The Central
American Court of Justice (CACJ) refused to make this type of ruling in
El Salvador v. Nicaragua where El Salvador asked the ICJ to enjoin
Nicaragua from fulfilling the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.'81 The CACJ
announced that invalidating the treaty would amount to the adjudication of the rights of another party without its consent to ICJ jurisdiction. 182 Therefore, Shahabuddeen feels the Court could not find that
Indonesia lacked capacity to enter into the treaty. 8 3 The same concerns applied to Portugal's contention that Australia disregarded the
rights of the people of East Timor by negotiating with Indonesia. 8 4 The
impact of a ruling with regard to Australia on Indonesia precluded the
ICJ from exercising its jurisdiction over Portugal's application. 185
D. Judge Ranjeva's Concurrence
In his opinion, Judge Ranjeva expressed disappointment with the
Majority's decision not to use the Case ConcerningEast Timor to clarify
its holding in Monetary Gold and the impact of interested third parties8 6 He saw the Case Concerning East Timor as the inverse of Monetary Gold and urged the court to analyze the details of the doctrine to
avoid future confusion. 187 Portugal's application assumes that its dispute with Australia involves an objective right erga omnes, the right of
the people of East Timor to self-determination.18 8 He wanted the majority to "ponder how far the analysis of the structure of the Court's reasoning... justified a conclusion as to whether.. .it was valid to transpose the jurisprudence of Monetary Gold."'8 9 Does the same principle
apply to preliminary questions of objective law? 90o He asserted that the
majority's use of Monetary Gold without further explanation left too
many unanswered questions.' 91
Similarly he disagreed with the conclusion that the Court would
179. Id.
180. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 124 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
181. Memorial of Nicaragua, Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.A.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, June 30, 1984, para.
257.
182. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 124 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 127-28.
185. Id. at 128.
186. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 129 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 132.
191. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 129 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
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have to adjudicate Indonesia's rights and duties in East Timor to address Portugal's claims. 192 He attributed three objectives to Portugal: 1)
the preservation of right of the People of East Timor to selfdetermination; 2) nullification of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation;
193
and 3) denying Indonesia the benefits of its treaty with Australia.
94
Portugal's application involved both objective and subjective rights.'
The objective rights served as the justification for the subjective rights
which were Portugal's ultimate goal.' 95 In order to nullify Australia's
treaty obligations, the ICJ would have to adjudicate directly upon Indonesia's rights. 196 Judge Ranjeva felt the majority should have offered
the parties an appropriate legal framework for limiting the undesirable
effects of such a situation and examined the scope of its prior decisions
97
to avoid future misinterpretation.'
E. Judge Vereshchetin's Concurrence
In Judge Vereshchetin's opinion, the Majority's decision ignored the
rights of the most important third party to the case, the people of East
Timor.' 98 He criticized his colleagues for failing to investigate East
Timor's views on the treaty.' 99 He found this error especially critical
where twenty years of neglect indicated that Portugal lacked the
knowledge about the wishes of the people of East Timor to properly represent it.200 Moreover, the ICJ has a duty to ascertain the will of the
protected people even under ordinary circumstances. 201 Specifically, the
Court should have considered whether Portugal truly represented the
interests of East Timor. 20 2 In this case, neither Portugal, nor Australia
20 3
provided evidence on the views of the people of East Timor.
Although the U.N. General Assembly has occasionally dispensed
with the requisite consultation of the inhabitants of a trust territory,
the practice traditionally applies only to extremely small populations
which do not constitute a 'people', or when special circumstances make
it unnecessary. 204 With East Timor, the General Assembly specifically
commanded the Secretary General to "initiate consultation with all parties" in order to find a solution to the continental shelf problem in the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 132 (Ranjeva, J., separate opinion).
Id. at 132-33.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 135 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 135-36.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 136 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Oct. 16).
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'Timor Gap'. 205 The U.N. Charter does not impose a consulting obligation on Administering Powers, but this does not mean that international law can never impose such a duty. 206 In fact, the ICJ recognized
the duty to consult inhabitants in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion. 20 7 Lack of consent from East Timor played an equally important
role in preventing the ICJ from deciding this case, but the Majority's
208
opinion ignored that aspect of the situation.
209

F. Judge Weeramantry's Dissent

Judge Weeramantry agreed that a controversy existed between
Portugal and Australia and gave unqualified support to East Timor's
right of self-determination. 210 He refused to accept that the jurisdictional question precluded a decision on Portugal's claim and felt the
Majority stopped at threshold of the case. 211 Instead, Weeramantry
found the issues of the case so interconnected that the preliminary matters and merits of the case were inseparable. 212 His dissent discussed
five issues. First, whether Australia's actions breached its duties and
obligations toward East Timor as a non-self governing territory apart
from those of Indonesia. Second, Portugal's standing to institute proceedings on behalf of East Timor and Australia's corresponding obligations toward it. Third, the nature of self-determination and sovereignty
over natural resources and whether Australia respected those principles. Fourth, Australia's self-determination obligations and to what extent they apply to all nations. Finally, he considered whether Portugal's Application constituted a misuse of the ICJ's authority. 213 Overall,
he found Portugal's application was within the competence of the Court
and despite the absence of a possible interested third party. 214
Weeramantry sees jurisdiction as a mixed question of law and
205. G. A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 227, U.N. Doc.A/37/51
(1982).
206. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 138 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
207. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 33.
208. East Timor 1995 I.C.J. at 138 (Vereshchetin, J., separate opinion).
209. The two dissenting opinions criticized the Majority for refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the Case ConcerningEast Timor. Surprisingly, the two judges expressed contradictory reasoning for their objections, with one finding the procedure and merits inextricably intertwined and the other finding them easily separated. After looking at all of
the opinions in this case it becomes clear that the concurring and dissenting opinion labels deals strictly with the jurisdictional question. The reasoning in the opinions defy
easy categorization. It is necessary to read all of the opinions in this case to truly understand the complexity of the situation presented by Portugal's objection to the Treaty Concerningthe Zone of Cooperation.
210. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 142 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 223 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
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the parties' situation plays a central role in the Court's decision
whether to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, he took judicial notice
of several key facts: 1- although Portugal left East Timor in 1974, the
U.N. considered Portugal, and not Indonesia, its Administering
Power;. 216 2- Australia never sought U.N. approval before entering the
Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation and East Timor never consented to
it;.217 and 3- Australia and East Timor had never entered into a delimitation agreement. Then, he proceeded to discuss the merits of Concerning East Timor.
First, Weeramantry asks whether Australia breached its duties to
East Timor apart from owed to Indonesia. He felt that East Timor's
status as a non-self-governing territory made any adjudication as to Indonesia's rights unnecessary. 21 8 As such, its resources uncontrovertibly
belonged to the people of East Timor. 219 Instead, the ICJ must consider
whether any member states may:
a) enter into a treaty with another state, recognizing
that the territory awaiting self-determination has been
incorporated into another state as a province of that
state; and b) to be a party to arrangements in that
treaty which deal with the resources of that territory
without the consent, either of the people of the territory,
220
or their authorized representative.
The Court need not consider the lawfulness of Indonesia's conduct. 221 If
East Timor is a non-self-governing territory, every nation has a duty to
recognize its right to self-determination as well as permanent sover222
eignty over its natural resources.
The judge discussed whether the ICJ had a duty to revisit questions previously resolved by U.N. resolutions and concluded the ICJ
must defer to the decisions of other U.N. organs absent proof that they
have exceeded their authority. 223 Neither Portugal, nor Australia, presented evidence of such a problem in this case, so the Court had no reason to doubt the validity of existing U.N. resolutions regarding East
Timor. 224 Decreasing support for a position and the passage of time
does not erode the validity of the resolution. 225 Weeramantry rejected

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 153 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 154 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 155.
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the Majority's concern with Indonesia's rights as an excuse for refusing
to exercise jurisdiction, saying that ICJ rulings always effect third par226
ties.
This opinion also distinguished East Timor from Monetary Gold.
Monetary Gold involved a dispute over gold belonging to Albania who
was not before the Court. In contrast, there was no claim against a
third party here. 227 While resolution of the controversy over East Timor
might effect the interest of Indonesia, it would not form the very subject
matter of the dispute. 228 If the Court were to interpret the interested
third party concept so broadly, the ICJ would also be forced to join the
many parties who dealt with Indonesia in connection with East
20
Timor. 229 This stretches Monetary Gold too far.
In the international arena, the ICJ really serves as the last resort
for the resolution of disputes. 231 Consequently, Monetary Gold's Third
Party Rule cannot be allowed to outweigh the Court's duty to decide
cases. 232 "[A]n international tribunal is master of its own jurisdiction"
and cannot allow doubt to be its reason for declining a case. 233 Such a
234
rigid interpretation would paralyze the international justice system.
The Court has a duty "to give the fullest decision it may in the circumstances." 235 It is not enough that a third party is affected by a decision;
the matter must be the very subject matter of the case. 236 The Court
must make a judicial determination of the responsibilities of a non238
party state. 237 Finally, joint wrongdoers face individual liability.
Moreover, international Law offers a number of other safeguards to
protect the rights of absent third parties. 239 ICJ opinions bind only parties to a dispute, 240 other states may intervene or institute their own
proceedings, 241 no stare decisis applies to international law, and each

226. Id.
227. Id. at 157.
228. Id.
229. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 157 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 160.
232. Id. at 159.
233. Id.
234. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 159 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
235. Id. at 159 (citing Continental Shelf (Libya Arab/Malta)).
236. Id. at 168.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 170. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
240. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 59. Cf., Reilly & Orodnez, supra note 133, at 478
("[1It would be difficult to say an ICJ judgment rendered in a dispute between two states
would have a binding effect only upon the parties. This is true despite Article 59 of the
court's statute, especially where the decision involves a territorial dispute concerning... the continental shelf.")
241. STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 62.
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state bears international responsibility for its own wrongdoing. 242
Therefore, the Court cannot appropriately allow one state's nonacceptance of ICJ jurisdiction prevent states accepting its jurisdiction
243
from settling their disputes.
Next, Weeramantry explained the nature of rights erga omnes and
self-determination. "An erga omnes right... is a series of separate
rights singulum, including inter alia, a separate right erga singulum
against Australia and a separate right erga singulum against Indonesia. These rights are in no way dependent upon the other."2 44 Making
Indonesia a necessary party hampers the operation of the erga omnes
doctrine. 245 The U.N. Charter gives all states certain rights and responsibilities that all others must recognize and each must answer for its
own failures. 246 The Court could not allow Indonesia to protect those
countries from treating it as Administrating Power by avoiding being
brought before the Court. 247 Portugal's Application dealt, not with the
lawfulness of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation, but the lawfulness
of Australia's conduct in making the treaty.248 Therefore, the invalidity
of the treaty was not a precondition for an ICJ ruling that Australia
249
acted unlawfully.
Weeramantry similarly rejected Australia's argument that Portugal brought its application against the wrong party. He notes that any
claim against Indonesia would question the legality of its occupation of
East Timor. 250 He concludes that the question here concerned whether
Portugal made a supportable legal claim against Australia. 251 The
judge wanted the Court to expand its notion of the consent principle of
25 2
jurisdiction and decide the case.
Weeramantry also refused to accept that Indonesia had replaced
Portugal as Administrative Power of East Timor. Permitting Indonesia
to assume Portugal's position as Administering Power by occupying
East Timor after the latter left would destroy the "sacred trust" created
by the Charter. Weeramantry had three concerns with such an approach. 253 Precedent does not support the idea that a loss of physical
control amounts to a loss of Administering Power status. Administer-

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 170. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 173 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id. at 174.

Id.
Id. at 176.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 176 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
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ing Power means more than physical control. 254 It creates a duty to
protect the welfare of the people of the non-self-governing territory, to
preserve their assets and their rights, and to conserve their right to
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 255 Consequently,
Portugal remained Administering Power over East Timor even after it
left in 1974.
The United Nations cannot act as a substitute for a displaced Administrating Power. 256 It lacks the resources to provide the particular
attention envisioned by the Charter 257 . It depends on its members to
transmit information about its trust-territories to the U.N. Secretary
General. 255 Depriving Portugal of its Administering Power status because of its loss of control over East Timor would leave East Timor's
people defenseless and voiceless precisely when those rights are threat259
ened or violated.
Portugal's status was repeatedly recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council 260 and those resolutions remain in effect
until rescinded or superseded by new resolutions. 261 The Court cannot
unilaterally take it upon itself to grant or withhold Administering
Power status based on a bad colonial record. 262 Portugal's poor colonial
record remained irrelevant until the organs of the U.N. sought to act on
it.263
The General Assembly had the authority to revoke Portugal's
status as Administering Power and chose not to do so. 264 Therefore, the
ICJ could not take away Portugal's ability to intervene on East Timor's
behalf by refusing it standing to appear before the Court. 265 Such a
ruling would defeat the purpose of the Charter's trustee-ship. 266
Weeramantry similarly rejected Portugal's claims that Australia
ignored East Timor's Right to self-determination and sovereignty over
its natural resources? East Timor's right to self-determination and the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources form the core
of the East Timor case. 267 The United Nations, Portugal and Australia
254. Id.
255. Id. at 180-81.
256. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 181 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 187.
261. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 191 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
262. Id. at 192.
263. Id. at 187.
264. Id. at 187-88. It was not as if the United Nations had simply overlooked East
Timor. The Committee of 24, the General Assembly's organ overseeing decolonization,
put East Timor on its agenda and referred to it in its committee report to the General Assembly year after year. Id. at 191.
265. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 188 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 193.
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unquestionably recognized East Timor's status as a non-self-governing
territory possessing the right to self-determination. 268 Yet, Australia
argued that the U.N. Charter created no express obligations on states to
promote self-determination in a territory over which they had no control. 269 Instead, Solidarity 270 required only that they assist in actions
taken by the U.N.. without an independent duty to of non-recognition of
Indonesia.271 Furthermore, the international community had expressed
no criticism of Indonesia or the other states which had dealt with Indonesia in relationship to East Timor. 272 Consequently, the Treaty on the
Zone of Cooperationhad no impact on the people of East Timor's right of
self-determination.273 Weeramantry disagreed.
He wrote of the central role self-determination plays in the structure of the U.N. and the concept's recognition by international conventions, customary law, and judicial decisions. 274 The judge found the
right to self-determination central to developing friendly relations 275
among nation states. 276 He reminded the reader that every member of
the United Nations undertook "a solemn contractual... to promote conditions of economic progress and development, based on respect for the
principle of self-determination." 277 The U.N. expects Administering
Powers to make the interests of the people living in the territory paramount, to account for their political aspirations, and to assist them in
278
developing their own political institutions.
The U.N. has adopted a number of resolutions aimed at implementing self-determination at a practical level. For example, it adopted
the Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples27 9 in 1960 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States280 in 1970. The ICJ's own decisions have also supported the right
to self-determination. 2 1 In the end, Weeramantry found Portugal's

268. Id.
269. Id. at 194.
270. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5.
271. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 194 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. U.N. Charter art. 1(2).
276. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 194 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
277. Id. at 195.
278. U.N. Charter art. 73.
279. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A.Res. 1524, U.N. GOAR, 15th Sess. (1960).
280. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (1970).
281. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 12.
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claim that, by becoming party to an agreement recognizing East Timor's
incorporation into Indonesia concerning the exploitation of nonrenewable resources before it could exercise its right to selfdetermination, Australia had violated the principle of self28 2
determination.
Later in his opinion, Weeramantry referred to a fundamental inconsistency between East Timor's right to self-determination and inter28 3
national recognition of Indonesia as its new Administering Power.
He points out several differences between the power exercised by Indonesia and the authority of an Administrating Power. Portugal: 1) acted
as a fiduciary; 2) under U.N. supervision; and 3) its authority was coterminous with its fiduciary status. 28 4 The judge concluded that the
Court should find the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation'srecognition of
East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia was incompatible with East
Timor's right to self-determination and Australia's duties under inter28 5
national law.
In addressing the clash between the peremptory norm if Australia's
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and the preemptory
norm of East Timor's right to sovereignty over its natural resources,
Weeramantry said that Australia did not enjoy an absolute right to the
resources in the Timor Gap. 28 6 East Timor claims in the area qualified
those of Australia since their coasts were separated by only 250 miles of
ocean. 28 7 Furthermore, the ICJ lacked competence to decide whether
Australia and Indonesia had created an equitable division of resources
from the standpoint of East Timor. 288 Instead, the decision need only
determine whether the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperationhad been entered into without the consent of East Timor or Portugal, its Adminis28 9
tering Power.
Finally, the Weeramantry concluded that "[w]here a territory had
been acquired in a manner which leaves open the question whether legal sovereignty has been duly acquired, countries entering into treaty
relations.. .have options stretching all the way from de facto recognition... [to] de jure recognition." 290 Australia's treaty with Indonesia reflected one of the highest forms of de jure recognition, making its incompatible with its claims to respect East Timor's rights to self282. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 201 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion). The Treaty
on the Zone of Cooperation explicitly names East Timor an "Indonesian Province" and the
people of East Timor receive no benefits under the treaty. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 203. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 204. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
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29 1
determination and permanent sovereignty over its natural resources.
Consequently, Australia breached its duty to abstain from any action
which nullified or impaired territorial rights to self-determination.

The right of self-determination enjoyed by the people of East Timor
and the corresponding duties placed on members of the international
community emerge from many sources of international law, including
293
treaties 292 and custom. Australia is not exempt from those duties.
Moreover, several Security Council resolutions demanded the collective
support of its members in enforcing East Timor's right to selfdetermination. 294 If East Timor had an erga omnes right to selfdetermination, a fact admitted by Australia, all U.N. members had a
duty to respect that right. 295 This required Australia to do more than
obey specific directions and prohibitions from the United Nations. It
296
was required to conform with the underlying principles of that right.
A number of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation provisions violate the spirit of self-determination. The treaty expressly recognized
East Timor as a province of Indonesia, with no evidence that the people
of East Timor chose that status. 297 It dealt with non-renewable resources arguably belonging to the territory and made no mention of
East Timor's rights. 298 In addition, the treaty created no method of repudiation to become effective when East Timor exercised its right to
self-determination in spite of an initial term of 40 years. 299 This created
"a real possibility" that East Timor's natural resources would be exhausted before it gained control over them. 300 The ICJ could not endorse such conduct.
At last, Weeramantry argued that unless the ICJ recognized a dispute in this case, the role of Administering Power would become
empty. 301 An Administering Power must commit to the "sacred trust"
granted to it by the United Nations. 302 If falters in its duties and fails
to take legal action in response to threats to the non-self-governing territory it administers, it violates its basic obligations. Portugal must
have access to the Court to fulfill its obligations to East Timor. 303

291.
292.
Human
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Weeramantry refers specifically to the U.N. Charter and the two International
Rights Covenants of 1966.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 206. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 212.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 212. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 217. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting opinion),
Id.
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Weeramantry urged his colleagues to entertain Portugal's application
and enforce East Timor's erga omnes rights to self-determination and
304
sovereignty over its natural resources.
G. Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski's Dissent
Although Judge Skubiszewski agreed with the Majority's rejection
of Australia's claim that no dispute existed between Portugal and Australia, he objected to its decision not to exercise jurisdiction because any
decision with regard to East Timor necessarily implicated Indonesia's
interests.3 0 5 In his perspective, the Court could have separated Australia's responsibilities toward Portugal and East Timor from the rights
and obligations of Indonesia. 30 6 In fact, his opinion suggested that the
ICJ shirked its responsibilities by refusing to decide the case, saying it
should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a case sparingly. 30 7 The
Court could have addressed the request to reaffirm the rights of the
people of East Timor to self-determination,3 0 8 territorial integrity, and
permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, and Portugal's duties, powers and rights as the Administering Power over East
Timor without overextending itself. 309 Ruling on the rights of Portugal
and the people of East Timor need not indicate an implicit legitimization of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. 310 Instead, the Court
could have resolved the initial claims without moving onto Portugal's
311
other claims.
Under this analysis, the legal interests of Indonesia would not
"form the very subject matter of the decision", 312 and would not serve as
"a prerequisite" for determining the case between Portugal and Australia. 313 "The claims submitted by Portugal [were] distinct from the alleged rights, duties, and powers of Indonesia. There [ought to be] no
304. Id. at 220.
305. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 226 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 237.
308. The right to self-determination is the right of a person living in a territory to determine the political and legal status of that territory - for example, by setting up a state
of their own or choosing to become part of another state. Few non-self governing territories existed prior to the end of World War II. Those that it existed were created by treaty.
The situation changed after 1945 with the emergence of the United Nations. The concept
applies to 3 types of trust territories: 1) Mandated Territories - prior German and Turkish colonies administered by the Allies after World War I; 2) Trust Territories - Former
colonies after World War II, only one island in Japan remains; and 3) Non-self Governing
Territories such as East Timor.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 290.
309. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 239.
310. Id.
311. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 239 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
312. Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32.
313. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 242 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
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difficulty in separating the subject matter of the present case from.. .a
theoretical case between Portugal and Indonesia." 31 4 Although the effect of both cases might be the same, 'the rights and duties of Indonesia
and Australia [were] not mutually interdependent." 315 The Court could
not claim an absolute bar on jurisdiction because of possible side effects
on third countries. 316 The ICJ Statute adequately protected Indonesia's
interests with regard to East Timor. 31 7 Consequently, the Court could
properly address Portugal's first claim against Australia, 318 especially
because several U.N. Resolutions supported Portugal's status as Administering Power and the United Nations had never revoked that
31 9
power.
Judge Skubiszewski also found Australia's recognition of East
Timor's right to self-determination inconsistent with its negotiation and
adoption of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperationwith Indonesia. 320 He
objected to Australia's treatment of Indonesia as a direct replacement
for Portugal. In his view, Portugal possessed a stronger claim on East
Timor because of its (previous?) status as Administering power. 321 The
rights of the East Timor people depended on the efforts of all states "to
promote.. .the realization of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities
entrusted
to
it
by
the
Charter
regarding... implementation." 322 He dismissed the fact that Australia had to
negotiate with Indonesia or lose its rights in the area, and condemned
its negotiations with Indonesia. 323 Essentially, Australia should have
respected Portugal's status as Administrating Power of East Timor until the United Nations declared otherwise. 324 Portugal's loss of territorial control had no effect on its status as Administrating Power. 325

314. Id. at 249.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 245.
317. Id.
318. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 245 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
319. Id. at 247-48.
320. Id. at 261.
321. Id.
322. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations-which is widely regarded as customary international law-expressly makes the
territorial integrity of a state contingent on its possession of a consensual representative
government ...
[Therefore,] the legitimacy of a state government is no longer merely a concern of domestic jurisdiction.
Eztah, supra note 69, at 510.
323. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 264 (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting opinion).
324. Id. at 270-71.
325. Id. at 277.
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GAUGING THE EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The ICJ's decision not to exercise jurisdiction in the Case Concerning East Timor reflects the historical limits placed on the right to selfdetermination by sovereignty and enforcement issues. 326 States jealously guard their sovereignty, making jurisdiction an extremely important issue. 327 The Court must worry about the threat to its credibility
when it makes decisions which no one can enforce. 328 International law
considers humanitarian intervention as a clear "exception to the otherwise 'absolute' right of a state to govern free from the interference of
any foreign state(s)." 329 One scholar attempted to explain the Majority's
decision not to hear the case as a deferral to General Assembly's resolutions granting Portugal status as Administering Power and its inaction
in the face of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation. 330 He claimed that
decision in East Timor "implicitly invited the political organs [of the
U.N.] to revisit the issue of East Timor."331 The ICJ has waited long
332
enough for the United Nations to act.

The U.N. Charter urges its members to undertake responsibility for
administering non-self governing "territories whose people have not yet
attained a full measure of self government," to recognize that the interests of their inhabitants "are paramount, and to accept as a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories." 333 Yet, the Court's decision not to exercise
326. One scholar finds that self-determination contains "an internal conflict between
state rights to self-determination, and the rights of minorities within states to dismember
or challenge the state in the name of another competing norm of self-determination."
Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial
Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 260. (1996). See Nanda, supra note 97, at 263-76 (noting a
number of different arguments advanced by states to resist demands for succession); Michael Reppas, The Lawfulness of HumanitarianIntervention, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 463,
463 (1997) (commenting on the distinct conflict between humanitarian intervention and
the "[tihe supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power" of independent states).
327. ICJ decisions do not bind all members of the United Nations. Reilly & Orodonez,
supra note 133, at 436. As mentioned previously, the ICJ may exercise jurisdiction over a
party if it has accepted jurisdiction under the Optional Clause of the U.N. Charter, art. 36
(2). Furthermore, states can make explicit reservations on the exercise of jurisdiction,
which have reciprocal application on the opposing party. Id.
328. Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-DialogicAbstention by the InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MICH. J. IN'L L. 399, 405 (1997). The author
presents a theory that the ICJ uses an arsenal of techniques and devices' to refrain from
acting prematurely and condemning itself to irrelevancy. Id.
329. Reppas, supra note 326, at 463.
330. Perez, supra note 328, at 423.
331. Id. at 424.
332. In considering its provisional agenda for the fifty-second session of the U.N., the
General Assembly again deferred consideration of East Timor. Press Wire, General Assembly Adopts Agenda and Organizationof Work for Fifty-Second Session, Sept. 23, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS database.
333. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73. This provision applies to all colonies and territories which
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jurisdiction abandoned the people of East Timor to the power struggle
between Portugal and Indonesia. 334 This is directly contrary to the aspirational quality of the United Nations. 335 If the right to external selfdetermination has risen to the level of customary law, the Court has a
duty to see that the international community respects that right.
The United Nations' Charter created trust territories to protect
precisely those who find themselves in situations similar to that of East
Timor. 336 Under the non-self governing territory provision, the U.N.
expects an Administering Power:
to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the people concerned,
their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their
just treatment and their protection against abuses;
to develop self-government, to take due account of the
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in
the progressive development of their free political institutions according to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement;
to further international peace and security;
to promote constructive measure of development...
[and]
to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require... information...relating to economic, social, and
educational conditions in the territories for which they

are respectively responsible .... 337

are geographically separate and distinct ethnically and/ or culturally from the country
exercising administering power, particularly those territories in a subordinate position.
AKEHURST, supra note 26, at 293.
334. Ved Nanda has argued that "severe deprivation of human rights often leaves no
alternative to territorial separation" which ought to allow succession. Nanda, Claims to
Succeed, supra note 97 at 280. The people of East Timor deserve the same level of protection from Portugal.
335. The Permanent Court of International Justice, the ancestor of the ICJ has been
described as an instrument "for securing peace as far as this aim can be achieved through
law."

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT 3 (1985). The international community hoped to encourage nations to bring their disputes to the court instead of resorting to force. Reilly & Ordonez,
supra note 133, at 436.
336. As of 1995, various aspects of international law licensed 185 state to represent,
and some say coerce, the 5,000 nations in their control.
Paul Brietzke, Self-

Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 69, 70 (1995).
337. U.N. Charter, art. 73.
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Under this criterion, Portugal failed in its duty as Administering Power
of East Timor.
For example, the General Assembly criticized Portugal on a number of occasions for its failure to submit reports on the conditions in
East Timor to the Secretary General; 338 the Security Council issued
several resolutions condemning it for its failure to implement the
United Nations' decolonization. 339 Nevertheless, Portugal continued to
treat East Timor as an overseas province and neglected to recognize its
right to self-determination until it fled during the Carnation Rebellion
in East Timor after 400 years of colonization. 340 Indonesia finally restored order to the country by sending its army into East Timor in December 1975.341 Indonesia later annexed East Timor, allegedly at the
342
request of one of its leading political parties.
Consequently, after Indonesia's military intervention and the subsequent integration of East Timor into Indonesia during the mid-70's,
few states regarded Portugal as the Administering Power of East
Timor. 343 Given the role of custom 344 in the development of international law, it should not be surprising that states such as Australia considered Indonesia to be East Timor's Administering Power and negoti345
ated treaties on that basis.

It seems inadequate for an aspirational body such as the International Court of Justice to use the compulsory jurisdiction argument to

avoid addressing the needs of East Timor, especially where the fundamental rights of individuals belonging to a non-self governing territory
which the United Nations has pledged to protect are at stake. 346 The
ICJ or other U.N. organizations ought to step in when an Administering
Power is not fulfilling its responsibilities to its trust territory. The Majority's position gives the U.N. and its organs no authority to oversee
the cultural, social, and economic well-being of non-self-governing terri-

338. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 114 (Oda. J., separate opinion).
339. Security Council Resolutions 180 (1963); 183 (1963); 218 (1965; 312 (1972); and
322 (1972).
340. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 115 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 118.
344. Until recently, international law consisted of customary rules that had evolved
after a long historical process culminating in their recognition by the international community. Customary rules crystallize from usages or practices which have evolved in
roughly 3 circumstances: 1) diplomatic relations among states; 2) the practice of international organs; and 3) state laws, decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative practices that suggest wide acceptance of a general principal of law. J. Starke,
Introduction to InternationalLaw, 34-28, reprintedin CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 78,
at 141-43.
345. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 110 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
346. I.C.J. Stat. art. 73.
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tories once an Administering Power has been appointed. 347 Surely the
writers of the U.N. Charter never expected the international community to abandon a non-self governing territory to the neglect of an irre34
sponsible Administering Power indefinitely. 8
Whether the International Court of Justice had any choice but to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction remains uncertain. Part of the
problem resulted from the uncertainty about who should be looking out
for East Timor's interests. Although the U.N. continues to consider
Portugal the Administering Power over the territory, its position was
weakened by Indonesia's occupation of the territory following the Carnation Rebellion. Indonesia began dealing with other nations on behalf
of East Timor and the international community acquiesced in that behavior.
However, it would be equally problematic to blindly recognize Indonesia as the new Administering Power. 349 The international community certainly wishes to avoid an implied authorization of rule by conquest. 35 0 Instead, it must consult with representatives of the people of
East Timor to ascertain their wishes and take action to facilitate their
exercise of self-determination. The ICJ's decision succumbs to the pres35 1
sure to preserve the status quo.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the Case ConcerningEast Timor, the International Court of Jus-

347. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Portugalv. Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign
Autonomy and Sovereign Community, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 260 (1996).
348. As Judge Weeramantry notes in his dissent, Portugal faced international liability
if it failed to take action to protect East Timor's rights. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 188
(Weeramantry, J., separate opinion). This indicates that the United Nations continued to
exercise authority over its Administrating Powers. Which international organization is
more suited to perform this duty than the International Court of Justice.
349. A recent article in the Bangkok Post illustrates the horrors inflicted on the people
of East Timor during Indonesia's 'annexation' in the 70's.
In one of the most underreported events in recent history, 60,000 people were killed in the initial days of fighting. Another 140,000 died in
subsequent guerrilla warfare and the accompanying famine, disease
and extra-judicial killings. If Portuguese estimates of the pre-invasion
population are accurate, nearly one in three Timorese died as a direct
result of Indonesia's forced integration.
Bangkok Post, Comment, Remembering a Massacre: An End to Violence is All They Ask,
Nov. 13, 1997, available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS database.
350. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner incompatible with the Purposes of the Untied Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5.
351. 'Thus, although the judgments support the notion of legal obligations owed erga
omnes, the strong rhetorical weight of sovereign autonomy" makes the international obligations of self-determination little more than an illusion. Fitzgerald, supra note 347, at
37.
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tice recognized a dispute between Portugal and Australia over the nonself governing territory of East Timor, but failed to reach the merits of
the case. Both the Majority and Shahabuddeen felt that the consensual
nature of the ICJ's jurisdiction precluded it from addressing East
Timor's situation because any decision would impact the validity of the
Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation between Australia and Indonesia.
Vereshchetin criticized the Court for its failure to consider the most important third party, the people of East Timor, but agreed that the ICJ
lacked jurisdiction over the case.
Both dissenting judges felt the jurisdictional issues should not prevent the ICJ from hearing the case. Weeramantry found the procedural
issues and the merits of the case so intertwined that they could not be
separated. Consequently, he urged the Court to consider the merits of
East Timor. Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski, on the other hand, felt that
Portugal had successfully restricted its claims against Australia in such
a way that a ruling by the ICJ would not implicate Indonesia's interests.
The Majority's emphasis on the third party rights of Indonesia
while ignoring those of the people of East Timor reflects the inconsistency in the way international law treats nations and non-selfgoverning territories. Does the International Court of Justice really
want to send the message that the rights of a nation such as Indonesia
outweigh those of non-self governing territories such as East Timor?

